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The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Leson Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Trapp' affirmed the grant of preliminary and permanent in-
junctive relief against the defendant from "acting or attempting to
act as president and chief executive officer of the corporation" as
well as from "appearing at the corporation's premises . 2.."I Defen-
dant, shareholder and former president of the corporation, was
removed by the board of directors, which could be done by majority
vote without cause.3 The injunction therefore was proper to prevent
defendant from acting in his executive capacity.
Defendant was not removed as a director, and enjoining him
from appearing at the corporation's premises may well prevent him
from exercising his statutory obligation as a director.' The court
recognized this problem but, based on the evidence that key
employees would resign if defendant's presence at the business con-
tinued, the court upheld the injunction as the only alternative means
of continuing the business. The court recognized that ordinarily in-
junction might not be proper because an alternative would be
available by the majority of shareholders: removing defendant as a
director.s Such a solution was not available in this case because
under the articles of incorporation, three directors must be
shareholders and there were only three shareholders of the corpora-
tion. Under the peculiar facts of this case, perhaps the injunctive
relief is proper but such relief certainly should not be granted if any
alternative solution is available to the shareholders.
The facts of Leson illustrate how important it is in drafting arti-
cles of incorporation that requirements such as are here present be
weighed very carefully. If protection against outside directors is not
essential, do not provide for it.
In Hingle v. Plaquemines Oil Sales Corp.' the court faced an in-
terpretation of section 84 of the corporation laws.' This section pro-
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vides that a contract between a corporation and one or more of its
directors or officers is not void or voidable solely for this reason if
the facts were made known to the board of directors, or if the facts
were made known to the shareholders and the contract was approved
in good faith by the shareholders, or if the contract is fair to the cor-
poration. In Noe v. Roussel8 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the contract must always be fair to the corporation, virtually
rendering ineffective paragraphs A(1) and A(2 of section 84. The
fourth circuit in Hingle relied entirely on paragraph A(3) in
upholding large salary increases given to the president by the board
of directors upon a factual finding that the amount of the salary paid
the president was fair.
The case of Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic' illustrates that the
formation of a professional corporation entails much more than the
securing of tax advantages. In Streb, three doctors formed a profes-
sional medical corporation. Subsequently, two of the shareholders
terminated plaintiff's employment with the corporation and removed
him from the board of directors. These actions were taken legally by
a majority of the shareholders." Asserting that the action would
result in his loss of his accrued pension benefits and his pro rata
share in accounts receivable, plaintiff sought an involuntary dissolu-
tion of the corporation. The causes for dissolution are set forth in
sections 143 and 913 of the corporation laws." None of these causes
existed in this case, as the court properly found. However, the court
of appeal remanded the case so that the pleadings could be amended
to entitle the plaintiff to some relief.
The nature of the relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled is
doubtful. Section 906 provides that no "compulsory offer of shares
for purchase by or sale to the corporation" shall take place unless
the provision is stated on the share certificate. Thus, forced pur-
chase of the shares by the corporation cannot be ordered and no
market exists for such shares. Possibly, the plaintiff may be able to
seek the appointment of a receiver under section 151 which provides
for receivership when a majority of the shareholders are violating
the rights of the minority and endangering their interests.
It is doubtful if the Louisiana courts will, or should, follow the
example of Massachusetts in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
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Inc.'" Wilkes holds that in a closely held corporation, the majority
shareholders owe a duty of utmost good faith in their dealings with
minority shareholders and that discharging a shareholder as
employee without just cause is a breach of that duty. To require
professional persons to remain in the practices of their profession
with associates against their will would not be desirable as a public
policy. Thus, the only solution seems to be in carefully structuring a
shareholders' agreement under section 909'" to provide for an
equitable solution to this type of situation. The law hardly can per-
form this task satisfactorily.
12. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976), noted in Note, Close Corporations:
Strict Good Faith Fiduciary Duty Applied to Controlling Stockholders, 38 LA. L.
REV. 214 (1977).
13. LA. R.S. 12:909 (Supp. 1968).
